Less than two months after the capitulation at Munich, on 16 November 1938, Hersch Lauterpacht delivered an address to the League of Nations Union of Cambridge University, his new academic home. The general subject of his presentation was the League of Nations. In his opening remarks, he confided to his audience that this was a topic about which he felt so strongly that he was unable to trust the 'freely spoken word' and that, while it was not his custom, he would read from a manuscript in order to maintain restraint and deliberation. But what have we to do in the meantime? Ought we to abandon the League and start afresh as soon as the obstacles disappear? Ought we to maintain it and to adapt it to the needs of a retrogressive period? Ought we to pursue the ideal of universality by reforming the League so as to make it acceptable for everyone? Ought we to admit that if peace * Professor of International Law, Department of Public Law, 00014 University of Helsinki, Finland. I wish to thank Professor Eli Lauterpacht for providing access to his father's papers, for his kind hospitality in Cambridge as well as for an abundant amount of biographical information, only a part of which has found its way into the present article but remains stored for farther use. Naturally, all responsibility for the ensuing interpretation of Sir Hersch's oeuvrt remains with the author.
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The the wall of his study, together with one of his mentor Arnold McNair and an engraving of Grotius) and was impressed by the Pure Theory of Law, they held strongly differing viewpoints regarding the place of natural law in legal construction. While Kelsen, in a pure modernist fashion, sought refuge in pure form from a politics gone awry, Lauterpacht insisted on the need to incorporate by reference fundamental (Victorian) values as the only guarantee against the politics of irrationalism.
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However, had Lauterpacht been simply a naturalist critic of nationalism and sovereignty, there would be little reason to distinguish him from the mainstream of the reconstructive scholarship that burgeoned during the 1920s in Europe and elsewhere, was branded 'utopianism' in the 1940s and 1950s, and is now practically forgotten. To be sure, be does confess to a Utopian federalism, liberal humanism and the associated values of cosmopolitan individualism. Kant (together with Grotius) is his acknowledged spiritual father. But the liberal legacy is ambiguous and in his professional work Lauterpacht treads a more complex path than that which could have been taken by such traditionalist inter-war figures as, for instance, Politis in France or Krabbe in the Netherlands -names which, unlike Lauterpacht, enter legal texts only to mark the discipline's historical continuity and pedigree, like ancestral portraits in the house of legal pragmatism, irrelevant beyond decorative purposes. 13 Lauterpacht belongs also to the modernist camp in that he, like Kelsen, shares a non-cssentialist epistemology. He is sceptical about the ability of juristic method to act as a safeguard against arbitrariness. Hence, for example, his emphatic and repeated criticism of judicial recourse to the doctrine of 'normal meaning* which assumes what is to be proved and simplifies out of recognition the constructive aspects of judging. l4 Principles of interpretation 'are not the determining cause of judicial decision, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means'. 13 Nor are pure facts impartial arbitrators of normative disputes. Whether an entity is a state is not imposed on the observer through an 'automatic test' but is the result of construction, undertaken, of course, 'in good faith and in pursuance of legal principle'.
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Law is how it is interpreted. Lauterpacht's modernity lies in his constant stress on the primacy of interpretation over substance, process over rule, in a way that leads him into an institutional pragmatism that is ours too. However, it raises the further question of power, about who is vested with the interpreting, meaning-giving authority. It thereby creates what for Lauterpacht became the single most important problem of the international legal order, the problem of self-judging obligations, the state's ability to interpret for itself what its obligations are. Now Lauterpacht is able to dispose of this difficulty only by returning to a liberal historicism which sees in public opinion, interdependence, common interests and the indivisibility of peace the compelling causes for a federalism that will do away with self-judgment As die international community outgrows the temporary phase of state sovereignty, a system of public administration will emerge which fulfils the ideal of die Rule of Law. Interpreting the law becomes the task of impartial and responsible public officials, in particular, lawyers. Even as the League was struggling with the Abyssinian fiasco, and neutrality and alliances surfaced to replace collective security, Lauterpacht continued to profess faith in the ultimate assertion of reason in the relations of man [from which] conceptions like the League of Nations and collective security must be regarded as manifestations of a permanent and ever recurring purpose, and their eclipse must be regarded as temporary and transient.' 7 Finally, Lauterpacht always saw himself, and frequently characterized himself, as a challenger of orthodoxy, a 'progressive'. 18 His main "works open up as criticisms of doctrines and theories that marginalize international law as a 'primitive' law or that seek to limit its application by recourse to concepts such as 'political' or 'nonjusticiable disputes'. Situating international law within a historical trajectory of European thought towards a Kantian, cosmopolitan law, he attacked entrenched substantive doctrines on the nature of recognition of states and governments, the position of die individual in international law, the criminal responsibility of states, state immunity, and so forth, all of which in one way or another appeared as obstacles in die law's great passage to universalism.
It is important to be clear about the sense of these critiques. The 'progressivism' from which they emanate is not in conflict with nineteenth century liberal sentiments. Rather, it is perfectly compatible with those values, as indeed is evidenced by the above quote from the speech by Victoria's husband. The target is not (European) tradition per se, nor even the main current of that tradition, namely Enlightenment thought Lauterpacht's critical posture is internal to its cosmopolitan and rationalist mainstream and is directed at the margins, against the 'metaphysical' or outright 'mystical' doctrines of nationalism, statehood and sovereignty. Thus, for instance, Lauteipacht criticizes Spinoza's doctrines of the reason of state and the separation of individual and state morality as an illogical deviation from the healthy rationalism of his general political philosophy. Somehow, when dealing with international relations, 'a fatalistic determinism took the place of reliance upon the power of reason ... the master's hand lost its cunning'." As I will argue more fully later on, Lauterpacht's critique issues from, or at least can be understood against, the background of the Austrian liberalism which had its heyday in the 1860s but then disintegrated under the pressures of the nationalist, anti-Semitic mass movements of the fin de siecle years. For Lauterpacht 'Hegelian' philosophy, together with the associated code names of 'Hobbes' and 'Machiavelli', assume the role of respectable scholarly representatives for those anti-liberal sentiments, the separation of law and statehood from die rationally right 20 From such posturing, Lauterpacht's critique extends to 'politics' in general, branded as irrational, egotistic, short-sighted, and certainly 'unscientific'. All of this ensues from his aim to liberate history's intrinsic rationality through a legal ordering of international affairs.
Lauterpacht's ambivalence towards colonialism may illustrate the direction and limits of his liberalism. On the one hand, Lauterpacht regards the nationalist exploitative face of imperialism as 'the most ruthless economic exploitation of native peoples, maintained by the despotic rule of military administration'. 21 On the other hand, he admires the 'liberal tradition in British foreign policy' that abolished slavery and the Congo Free State and led to treaties to protect the natives. Lauterpacht saw these activities as marking a progressive turn in the doctrine of the subjects of international law which became concrete in the League's Mandates system. 22 The differentiation works on the basis of humanitarian sentiments that were quite central to die mid-Victorian liberal consciousness. Awareness of complexity, ulterior motives, die powers of desire and the effects of its repression -essential to modem mentality and especially its (tragic) realism -are non-existent Whereas Kelsen, for instance, was quite conversant with Le Bon's theories of the irrational behaviour of the masses, it would have been unthinkable for Lauterpacht to integrate such disturbing evidence into his ordered world. For Lauterpacht even at the worst of times, Lauterpacht's work combines Victorian ideals and a hermeneutics of judging that gives it both a historical and contemporary feel. We have been able to add little to the analysis of the relationship of law and politics since the debates between Lauterpacht, E.H. Carr and Julius Stone. 24 We still regard as authoritative his writings on the Permanent Court or its successor, indeed his writings on any substantive international law problem. As the hundredth anniversary of his birth approaches, Lauterpacht remains interesting for he belongs to the era of our fathers and grandfathers, bridging the gap between the liberal rationalism of the nineteenth century and the functional pragmatism of the late twentieth century. Close and distant at the same time, be is uniquely placed to provide an understanding of why it is that we stand now where we do. Whatever Oedipal urge may be satisfied by a recounting of his work will, I hope, be excused by the fact that we too are historically situated in a project that is not only an abstract exercise in ideas but a continuum of political, moral and professional choices. n That law is an effect of lawyers' imagination is nowhere clearer tiian in the development of international law from the isolated diplomatic practices of the nineteenth century into a legal order sometime early in the twentieth. There is in fact, whatever the names used in the books, no system of international lawand still less, of course, a code. What is to be found in the treatises is simply a collection of rules which, when looked at closely .appear to have been thrown together, or to have been accumulated, almost at haphazard.' 2 ' Two strategies seemed possible. One could either take whatever materials -treaties and cases -one could find that bore some resemblance to domestic law and explain the inevitable gaps in the system as a result of the 'primitive' character of international law. 28 Otherwise one could try to expand the law's scope by arguing, as Grotius had done, from Roman and domestic law, general principles and ideas about a common morality. 29 Although in fact both avenues were followed, the former seemed to realize better the statism and the objective of the 'scientification' of law that had been the great aim of nineteenth century jurisprudence.
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However, such a 'primitive' law proved unable to prevent the First World War or even to regulate its conduct Whereas in many aspects of intellectual life the shock of the war was expressed by a turn away from traditionalism, mainstream reconstructive thought in international law sought to bring to completion the project of creating an international public order on the same principles that had underlain
25
A Lauterpacht's thesis is that the law that regulates the affairs of states is neither 'special' nor 'primitive', but is like any other branch of the law. He critiques the 'tendency of international lawyers to treat fundamental questions of international law apart from the corresponding phenomena in other fields of law'.
35 While international law does have 'imperfections' (the absence of a doctrine on the vitiating effect of duress, the broad scope left for the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, the voluntary character of third-party dispute solution), these are merely transient difficulties that the inevitable development of economic interdependence, democracy and enlightened public opinion will do away with.
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The form of Lauterpacht's argument is important. It reconstructs the law's unity as a scientific postulate. Law, no less than physics, shares a horror vacui; it detests a vacuum. 37 For scientific evaluation, a topic must be construed as a totality. This can be achieved by legal analogy, that is 'an application to the domain of law of that conception of analogy which logicians and scientists necessarily apply in their respective disciplines'. 38 Though more uncertain, and prone to misuse for special pleading, analogy is the lawyer's means of supplementing fragmentary or contradictory materials so as to ensure systemic unity.
In the liberal fashion, Lauterpacht's attack was conducted in the name of the universal principles of science -logical consistency and correspondence with facts. Positivism failed in both. It was logically incoherent: state will cannot be the ultimate source of the law. Where does the rule that says that will binds originate? To avoid circularity, the pacta sunt servanda or an equivalent metanorm must be assumed to exist as a non-consensual norm.
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More importantly, positivism is in variance with 'facts'. Analogies shows that judges and arbitrators use maxims of municipal jurisprudence and general principles of law (equity, justice) to fill gaps between consensual norms. 40 States acquire and dispose of territory in a manner analogous to transactions over private property. 41 Domestic notions of occupation and possession structure controversies in the law of the sea. 42 Practice concerning state servitudes, succession and responsibility is based on the application of private law concepts. 43 Treaties are applied, interpreted and terminated like private contracts. 44 Rules of evidence and procedure (such as estoppel or the res judicata) have no special international sense. 45 Positivists, however, have failed to notice these facts and use 'ingenious reasoning' to protect their 'arbitrary dogmafs]'. 46 Lauterpacht uses expressions like 'metaphysical' and 'mystical' in their modern sense, as synonymous for unreal or unscientific, to challenge the special position given by positivists to sovereignty.
47
Here as elsewhere, scientism is accompanied by methodological individualism, a liberal political theory. Statehood cannot set up a permanent veil between the international legal order and individual human beings. Being 'an artificial personification 31 All law has to do with regulating human behaviour, analogy is really but an aspect of the law's wholeness. 32 Therefore, contrary to the received view, states can also be punished and subjective fault remains an element of their responsibility. 64 This is not a result of a formal completeness of the Kelsenian type, meaning that in the absence of law, the plaintiff has no valid right and his claim must be rejected. 65 The very notion of 'law's absence' is suspect as it presumes that law consists of isolated acts of state will. But if law is conceived in terms of general principles, judicial balancing and social purposes, then 'gaps' connote only primae impressionis difficulties to decide cases. Legal argument is always eventually able to fill the gap. 66 Even 'spurious gaps' may be filled: an unsatisfactory single rule may be bypassed to give effect to a major principle of law, the intention of the parties or the purposes of the legal system as a whole. In this way, even legal change is regulated by the law.
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That the legal order is unable to recognize the existence of gaps results from its inability to limit their scope. In particular, there is no method to distinguish between 'essentially' important (political) and non-important (legal) issues. 68 Whether a matter touches on the state's 'vital interests' or 'honour' cannot be decided in abstraction from the state's own view of it: 'the non-justiciability of a dispute ... is nothing else than the expression of the wish of a State to substitute its own will for its legal obligations'. 69 Nor is a distinction between 'disputes as to rights' and 'conflicts of interest' any more successful. If the determination is left to the state itself, then it becomes an unlimited right to opt out of third party settlement If such determination is left to the tribunal, then it is tantamount to calling for a decision on the merits of the claim -and thus fails to serve the original purpose of providing the criterion through which the distinction could be made.
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Arguments about the clash between law, on the one hand, and justice or peace, on the other, are equally vacuous. 71 Critics mistake complexity for conflict Problems of the unjust rule may always be tempered by reference to the larger purposes of the law, rebus sic stantibus, abuse of rights or equity. 72 The needs of realism are incorporated in the state's undoubted right to determine the conditions of self-defence and in the exception to the vitiating effect of duress in the law of treaties.
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The refutations of the distinction between legal and political disputes in Function of Law turn on what appears as a sophisticated modern interpretativism: no international event is in 'essence' legal or political, its character as such is the result of projection, interpretation from some particular standpoint If the distinction were to be upheld, it would always allow a state to present its unwillingness to submit to the legal process as a result of the 'application' of this distinction. But, *[a]n obligation whose scope is left to the free appreciation of the obligee, so that his will constitutes a legally recognized condition of the existence of the duty, does not constitute a legal bond'. 74 That the question of self-judging obligations becomes the central problem of bis later doctrinal work follows from Lauterpacht's nominalism, the view that the law is always relative to interpretation. In Function of Law, this view leads him to focus on the impartiality of judges and arbitrators and to examine their ability to interpret the law so that everybody's vital interests will be secured. 75 To us, such an inquiry into judicial honesty and competence seems a somewhat facile solution for world peace, naive and old-fashioned. But Lauterpacht's nominalism is ours, too. Our own pragmatism stands on the revelation that it is the legal profession (and not the rules) that is important:
There is substance in the view that the existence of a sufficient body of clear rules is not at all essential to the existence of law, and that the decisive test is whether there exists a judge competent to decide upon disputed rights and to command peace.
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Function of Law puts forward an image of judges as 'Herculean' gap-fillers by recourse to general principles and the law's moral purposes that is practically identical to today's Anglo-American jurisprudential orthodoxy. 77 Moreover, it heralds the end of jurisprudence and grand theory in the same way that legal hermeneutics does -by focusing on the interpretative practices of judges. This ensures it a measure of 'realism', while its sophisticated interpretative approach avoids the pitfalls of voluntaristic positivism. Simultaneously, however, it remains hostage to, and is limited by, the conventions and ambitions of that profession. In this sense. Function of Law is the last book on international theory -the theory of non-theory, the acceptable, sophisticated face of legal pragmatism. academic elite that by 1933 in a famous vote at Oxford had by a large majority declared its unwillingness to 'die for King and Country'. 98 In his writings on statehood and jurisdiction, the constant playing down of the significance of national boundaries works to the same effect, as indeed does his 1928 article on the duties of states in relation to revolutionary activities of private individuals abroad. 99 There being no obligation on states to guarantee each other's legal or political systems, there is no legal justification for curtailing the political activities of Emigres either. The argument creates space for politics on a cosmopolitan scale, particularly important in an era of dictatorships, and supports the widespread inter-war phenomenon of revolutionary politics carried out from abroad.
Lauterpacht's newly found cosmopolitanism as an assimilation strategy is also suggested by the fact that his Viennese dissertation of 1922 had *reject[ed] private law analogy in any form'. 100 A year before disembarking in Britain he had argued that international law's development towards autonomy is undermined by a positivist jurisprudence that has constant recourse to private law analogy under the guise of 'general law concepts' to fill lacunae in positive law -a method that 'endangers the independence of international law and fails to recognize its peculiarity'.
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At the time, Lauterpacht argued that the special meaning of the private law concept distorts the inter-state relationship to which it is applied. "The differences between legal systems are disregarded and the fact forgotten that legal institutions must be construed within the context of their own legal systems.' 102 It is only when, in an exceptional case, '[pjositive international law itself adopts concepts and institutions which have already specific implications in one or more legal system' that we can speak of analogy -for instance, when 106 Nonetheless, one cannot fail to be struck by the transformation in outlook on international law implied by this change of heart At this point, the door was opened definitively to let international law emerge from its isolation as a marginal, or a special law, a collection of fragmented pieces of state will, and to argue that it constituted a whole system, a single, unified legal order. The 'principal weakness' was not one of substance but of interpretative competence. Because lawyers were not entitled to assume that the Pact was meaningless, it had to follow, in the absence of provision for third party determination, that it was the legal profession's collective (if decentralized) duty to do this, for instance by agreeing on a definition of aggression.'
While opposing realist scepticism about collective security, Lauterpacht was equally opposed to idealist attempts to explain away interpretative problems by accepting as self-evident particular understandings of the contested provisions and by holding states as bound by something they had clearly not accepted. The fact was that the Covenant, the Locarno Treaties, and the Pact of Paris were self-judging. If this might have rendered them legally non-existent under domestic law, in the international society it had to be accepted as a result of the (provisionally) insufficient degree of integration of this latter. 115 The attempt to constitutionalize politics under these instruments did not, then, make politics disappear, but relocated it within the inevitable 'discretion' that was available to interpret the status of actions contested under their broad terms. 
tions).
128 The rational solution, however, was to propose 'the conferment of a power of decision upon a qualified majority of the Council including all the Great Powers but excluding the disputants'. 129 In fact, Lauterpacht argued, inasmuch as the nemo judex principle was accepted as governing the interpretation of the Covenant, no formal amendment was necessary.
130 By means of these arguments, Lauterpacht was able to keep collective security and the constitutional character of the League intact Neutrality becomes a de facto position derived from a temporary procedural difficulty, not a principled right or fundamental feature of the system itself.
Neutrality involves political choice and freedom of action. Hence, the difficulty to find a place for it under a legally based international order. At die outset of die Second World War, Lauterpacht's views were strongly affected by an interest in not interpreting the lend-lease and United States' economic assistance to die allies as a violation of neutrality. After Pearl Harbor, however, he no longer felt so constrained. In a 1942 talk in the United States, Lauterpacht observed that there had been no agreed law on the matter in the inter-war era and that no such law was visible then. 131 The old law on neutrality was 'glaringly archaic', 132 a 'function of die legal admissibility of war'. 133 In a total war, such as world war, neutral trade with the enemy was an 'incongruous anachronism' and any rights of neutrality 'precarious and illusory'. 134 This was not a conflict where a state could remain neutral for it was fought for 'the purpose of vindicating the rule of law among nations'. 133 Nor did there exist any place for neutrality in the Allied-conceived future legal order. To the contrary, there would be a legal duty on 'all mankind' to make war upon die aggressor. 136 The principles of collective security and the indivisibility of peace would form part of the new law. The proposal was, of course, never adopted. Finally, Lauterpacht reacted to the events of the 1930s with the twin defence of the wounded idealist, abstraction and displacement In a discussion of peaceful change, he observed that the problem was much more significant than a mere revision of die Peace Treaties -the terms in which it was usually discussed. It related to the establishment of a true international legislature with compulsory membership, majority voting and effective enforcement Whatever setbacks the League had suffered, or might suffer, this objective -federalism -remained intact and would one day be realized due to its intrinsic rational force.
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The constitutionalization of politics and the solution to problems of peace by a temporal displacement is given a genera] form in Recognition in International Law, 
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Far from a mere technical rule, recognition is 'a task whose implications and potential consequences are of capital political significance'. 144 It is the vehicle for removing international status from the precarious realm of politics: statehood, governmental authority, belligerency, insurgency. Recognition becomes the master technique for establishing the connection between abstract rule and its concrete manifestation. For example, '[a] lawful acquisition would be meaningless unless it were accompanied by the right to have it acknowledged and respected'. 145 The shift of perspective from the rule to its recognition, from the abstract formulation of status to the duty to give effect to it, is a significant step towards making a reality of the legal order. If the order is a complete whole (as was argued in Analogies and Function of Law) and if each of its rules is accompanied by die duty to recognize the rights which it establishes (and not to recognize status brought about by violation), then indeed foreign policy can always be redescribed as the administration of the law. Where politics used to be central and law marginal, the relation of the two becomes reversed. Governmental freedom of action is reconceived as limited 'discretion' in the administration of the law. True, such decentralized administration reflects the undeveloped character of international law, which is, in turn, a reflexion itself of the undeveloped integration of international society. Pending the establishment of collective, impartial organs to undertake this task, however, comprehending the process of recognition in terms of legal duty is 'not a source of weakness of international law but a substantial factor in its development to a true system of law'.
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Recognition is a consistent and far-reaching attempt to imagine international law as a complete and self-regulating normative system. What first appears as an act of political will is revealed as an exercise of interpretative discretion. Today, however, the constitutivist view expounded in Recognition enjoys no greater adherence man it did fifty years ago. It seems too bold in suggesting that legal statehood is dependent on whether tbe world of diplomacy is prepared to grant it It seems too weak in failing to explain why rules about statehood could effectively constrain diplomacy in this task. Lauterpacht's redescription relocates policy, but does not diminish its centrality. Declarativism is naive as it assumes that the emergence of political entities endowed with legal rights and duties, and in particular of states (or governments, or belligerents), is a question 'of pure fact But statehood is not a physical fact that would be able to disclose itself mechanically for all the world to see, or whose presence or absence can be determined by some 'automatic' test, as is shown by the extreme variety of actually existing states. 133 Statehood is a conceptual construct which refers back to the presence (or absence) of a set of criteria for the attainment of the relevant status. What those criteria are and whether they are present depends on acts of human cognition.
According to

If that act of cognition is not present, for instance if nobody recognizes an entity as a 'state', then there is little point in insisting that the status still exists. Only through recognition can a fact transform itself into a 'juridical fact'.
154 A state or a government whose existence is acknowledged by nobody cannot successfully claim to be treated as such. Its status has reality only within its own solipsistic universe.
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The constitutive view acknowledges the complexity of the social world and the ensuing primacy of the interpretation of facts over facts in their 'purity'. Inasmuch as it holds recognition to be an act of 'pure polities', however, it goes too far in the opposite direction. From the existence of a gap between 'facts' and their cognition, it is observed that the two are wholly independent of each other, that recognition is an act of pure, unconstrained political will. But in fact nobody treats it as such. If statehood is a matter of fulfulling some antecedent criteria, then surely recognition must comply with such criteria. That it is regarded in such manner is evident, for instance, in the generally accepted view which holds premature recognition to be a violation of the law 156 and which tests governmental authority by reference to its effectiveness.
To hold otherwise would allow intervention in the internal affairs of the state.
The only open question that remains is to determine what the legal criteria for attaining the relevant status are, and how they are to be interpreted. Here there is, of course, much debate and discretion. On the one hand, a legal view is incompatible with politically loaded criteria, such as legitimacy of origin, religion, political orientation, or even the willingness to abide by international law. 158 On the other hand, such criteria cannot be purely factual, without violating the principle of ex injuria non jus oritur. The effectiveness of government cannot be just a matter of power, but must be accompanied by a degree of legitimacy.
159 Non-recognition of illegally attained title is not the consequence of a specific doctrine to that effect, but of the general principle that no one may profit from his own wrong. To be sure, there is always a 'political element' in appreciating such criteria. 160 But discretion is not free, at least it cannot be exercised for the advancement of one's own interests. In exercising it, states are fulfilling the function of administering international law.
Lauterpacht's modernist, neo-Kantian epistemology combines constitutivism and declared vism. Recognition is 'declaratory of facts and constitutive of rights'.
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Such a construction takes a strong view on interpretation. Facts do exist as the (absent) referents oPthe criteria for recognition. But they appear only in interpretation. As facts cannot interpret themselves 'there must be someone to perform that task'. 162 That someone is each state. Interpretation is not a political act of will, however. As its ultimate reference is a fact, it must be held as an act of cognition. We notice here the central paradox of modernist epistemology. For although knowledge (unlike will) is universal, it appears (like will) only in partial truths. Lauterpacht accepts relativism, but only as a temporary condition, a consequence of the fragmentary nature of the present world.
The problem is not only that interpretation is difficult (indeed, the complexity of international life is acknowledged in the intermediate doctrine of de facto recognition), 163 but also that we cannot be assured that it is always undertaken in good faith. Lauterpacht believes that accepting the legal character of recognition will to some extent diminish the likelihood of divergent findings. 164 In order to dispose finally of self-judgment, however, recognition must be collectivized, allocated to an 'impartial international organ'. 163 This can only be undertaken, however, when international integration jumps into its final form of universal organization with compulsory membership.
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Recognition illustrates the problems of modern law. Facts are needed to constrain (arbitrary) political will. However, facts need to be interpreted. At this point, politi- 239 At times it has done this after having expressly excluded the existence of an antecedent law in the matter. 240 A frequent strategy has been to aim at maximal effectiveness of the law, typically to curtail the 'artful devices' of the state burdened by the obligation.
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In a thoroughly realist vein, Lauterpacht dismisses the view of judicial practice as the application of rules, for 'those rules are often obscure or controversial'.
242 And yet, shunning realism, he takes care to qualify that this is not to give the Court a license to replace the law, or party intention, or to allow a 'rule of thumb' to replace a 'flexible, critical and discriminating' application of the law. 243 This balancing of freedom and constraint, creation and repetition, is a central part of Lauterpacht's Victorian mindset and constitutes the atmosphere of reasonableness and responsibility that he attributes to international courts. Everything depends ultimately on the practical wisdom of judges that enables them to see how far they can go and at what point deference to diplomacy and state will become necessary.
In fact, Lauterpacht's Utopia is a world ruled by lawyers. Each of the three reasons for judicial caution that he discusses is a reason of conjecture, linked to the present, temporary and intrinsically unsatisfactory character of international society. Lauterpacht thinks that judges should not legislate because they would lose the confidence of the governments. There would then be no cases submitted to them, and no guarantee that their decisions would be implemented. 244 Every reason is connected to the statist character of politics, and to self-judgment None of them would be present in Lauterpacht's federalist Utopia. There, national governments would have no sover- The need for an independent legal process arises from the wish to curtail selfjudgment. The legal process, however, is not an automatic application of rules. Claims presented by states are never fully right or wrong, but have 'varying degrees of legal merit'. 247 Everything depends on the judge's professional ability and good sense, his skill in finding a reasonable balance. With a subtle shift, the final restingplace of Lauterpacht's argument lies in the enlightened responsibility of judges and lawyers, their ability to manage world order by equitable compromises, by overruling unjust laws and suggesting desirable legislative changes. As Lauterpacht once noted, 'in the sphere of action, ideas may not be more potent than the individual human beings called upon to realize them'. 248 The image of progress is no longer (as in the inter-war 'political' period) that of collective security being realized in Geneva, nor (as it was after the Second World War) of UN bodies administering human rights. Nor is progress fixed in legal rules and principles. Instead, it now resides in the judicial profession, in its ability to construct a world of legal constraint by its daily activity of settling conflicting claims.
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Austrian liberalism of the fin de siicle was, Carl Schorske has written, a garden-variety Victorianism ... secure, righteous and repressive; politically it was concerned for die rule of law, under which both individual rights and social order were subsumed. It was intellectually committed to the rule of the mind over the body and to latterday Voltairism: to social progress through science, education and hard work. 249 Its backbone had been the 'legalistic, puritanical culture of both bourgeois and Jew'. 250 As the Empire slowly disintegrated at the turn of the century under the 245 Ibid, 100. 246 Tbia titt discussion of trre Court's atternpt to limit the appUcation of re^â bout judicial caution thin about the Court'! willingness to affirm the law's binding force in the face of governmental attempts to circumvent it Ibid, 84-87. 247 Ibid, 398. 248 'Brierly's Contribution', supra note 18, at 451. 249 Schorske, supra note 82, at 6. 250 Ibid, 1 pressure of nationalist agitation and class conflict, 'the only social group which seemed to represent the state were the jews'. 251 The Habsburg Jewry, in particular, had manifested a 'total dedication to liberalism'. 252 From this perspective, it is possible to understand why the ideals of rationalism and progress became so firmly embedded in Lauterpacht's work, just as it characterized the oeuvre of his more famous colleagues Jellinek and Kelsen. Lauterpacht's legal Utopia seeks to revive on a cosmopolitan scale the Victorian liberalism that failed to survive the offensives of nationalism and socialism in Central and Eastern Europe. 253 It might seem curious that an active Zionist during the second decade of this century was transformed into a cosmopolitan individualist during the third. However, (at least part of) Jewish nationalism had been essentially reactive and had arisen to combat German and Austrian anti-Semitism. What Viennese Zionists like Theodor Herzl -or Lauterpacht -wished to create was a secular, liberal-democratic state. In this they were opposed by the rabbis and the religious right 254 When the protective need for a national Jewish state no longer seemed pressing -after Lauterpacht's arrival in Britain -Zionism could transform itself back into a cosmopolitan ethos that was the natural home of the Jewish enlightenment 255 It was not until the oppression of the German Jewry began that an extreme protective need arose anew. At that point, notwithstanding his critical posture towards statehood, Lauterpacht was prepared to lend his efforts to support the establishment of the state of Israel.
Where late nineteenth century Viennese culture moved from the ideal of the man of reason to a search for the psychological, feeling man, Lauterpacht never followed suit His utopianism remained grounded in the idea of the rational man, convinced that peace and social order through law were inescapable rational necessities and political passion an external distortion. Still in 1946, almost absurdly, Lauterpacht's Victorian faith remained unshaken:
The modem state is not a disorderly crowd given to uncontrollable eruptions of passion oblivious of moral scruples. It is, as a rule, governed by individuals of experience and ability who reach decisions after full deliberation and who are capable of forming a judgment on the ethical merits of the issues confronting them. 279 1 have stressed the biographical and historical aspects of Lauterpacht's oeuvre to expel the sense that his doctrine was merely a free-floating academic play or at best a move in a sealed-off Utopian discourse. I see it as a consistent attempt to maintain, through projection, the wholeness of a social world and personal identity when none of the competing projects (of science, politics or economy) had been up to the task. Lauterpacht was a Victorian liberal in a time when the dialectic of the Enlightenment was only slowly asserting itself. That he had no doubts about the universal and intrinsically beneficent character of legal reason defines him as a historical agent whose defence of international law through an underlying federalist Weltanschauung maps out for us a large field of our shared professional past For me, Lauterpacht's main contribution is to have articulated with admirable clarity the theoretical and historical assumptions on which the practice of international law is based. If we now continue those practices, but feel embarrassed when trying to express their premises in the language of historical optimism, I see only two ways out Either the practice must be changed (so as to reflect our modern/post-modern theory), or we have to readdress the premises. In the latter case, we must ask ourselves whether it is possible to continue the project of a global federalism that should be managed by the last remaining group of Victorian gentlemen, international lawyers.
